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EFFECT OF FEDERAL TAX LEINS
ON OHIO REAL PROPERTY
It is apparent from the divergent opinions to be found on the subject
of federal tax liens that their scope and character are not completely
defined. Although in some respects these liens rest upon federal su-
premacy, it appears that one must go beyond that rather vague concept
in analyzing them.' The character of the problem has been well
circumscribed in these words: "The federal tax lien, though falling
within the field of federal taxation, is in truth a part, even if a highly
specialized part, of the field of creditors rights."2 Federal tax liens,
however, ".... do depart in large degree from the ordinary concepts of
creditor security laws."' In the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 this
area has undergone a change in order and in wording, the impact of
which cannot as yet be fully ascertained because of lack of judicial inter-
pretation. It is well to keep in mind, therefore, that the cases cited herein
were decided prior to the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.4
Although the following discussion is focused primarily on Ohio,
one may expect the similarity between state statutory law and the under-
lying federal law frequently to result in like case construction in this
rather specialized area of federal-state relations. In the absence, there-
fore, of clear authority on Ohio law, one may, in many situations, properly
look to non-Ohio sources to determine what well may be the law in Ohio.
Although realty is the principal consideration, the law discussed herein
is not necessarily exclusive of personalty, nor should the law as to per-
sonalty be disregarded. The three most important federal tax liens, each
of which is to be considered separately in this discussion, are the general
tax lien,5 the estate tax lien,' and the gift tax lien.' Because the laws
1 "Questions of priority and of lien for taxes are closely related and may
arise in the same case, but the present annotation does not cover the question of
the priority of Federal taxes over other claims except in so far as such priority is
based upon a lien. Priority of Federal taxes may also arise under the statute
giving preference to 'the debts due to the United States' out of the assets of an
insolvent (31 U.S.C.A. §191), since the term 'debts' includes taxes. Price v.
United States (1926) 269 U.S. 492, 70 L.Ed. 373, 46 S. Ct. 180. And such priority
may arise in bankruptcy under §64 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C.A. §104)."
105 A.L.R. 1244, 1245 (1936). The distinction made in the previous quotation from
A.L.R. dealing with federal tax liens. should also be kept in mind in this discussion
of federal tax liens. See also 174 A.LIR. 1373, 1388, 1394, 1399 (1948).
2 Clark, Federal Tax Liens and Their Enforcement, p. 5, SPECIAL ISSUE OF
LAWYERS TITLE NEWS. (1949). See also 3 GLENN, MORTGAGES'§433 et seq. (1943).
3 Anderson, Federal Tax Liens-Their Nature and Priority, 41 CALIF. L. REV.
241 (1953).
4 References to the Internal Revenue Code, unless otherwise designated, will
be to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
5 INT. REv. CODE, §6321 (formerly §3670).
6 INT. REv. CODE, §6324 (a) (formerly §827).
7 INT. REv. CODE, §6324 (b) (formerly §1009).
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governing these federal liens are in some respects dissimilar, it is of para-
mount importance when examining title to distinguish the particular type
of lien involved. The problems inherent in the determination of the
existence of a lien are many, 'but in all cases one must first decide upon
the type of tax debt on which the lien is based.
THE FEDERAL GENERAL TAx LIN
The federal general tax lien is the so-called "shotgun ' type of
federal lien. This lien is provided for by §6321 of the Internal Revenue
Code, which reads:
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay
the same after demand, the amount (including any interest,
additional amount, addition to tax, or assessable penalty, to-
gether with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto)
shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property
and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to
such person.
9
It will be noted that the language of the statute is broad enough to
cover the tax-debtor's liability for "any tax"' and to attach to all of his
.. .property and rights to property, whether real or personal." This
has been interpreted to include both tangible and intangible property,
even that which the tax-debtor acquires after the lien arose.1" It should
be kept in mind that the federal general tax lien, although general in
coverage, is specific in nature and can best be understood if one compre-
hends its rather all-embracive scope.
To say that the lien provided by this statute is a general lien on
all the property of the taxpayer does not help in the solution of
the problem presented; for a lien is not deprived of validity be-
cause it attaches to a number of pieces of property instead of to
a single piece, nor is it for that reason to be subordinated to a
junior lien attaching to a single piece of property. 1
s This apt description of the general tax lien is credited to Wright, Title
Examinations in Michigan as Affected by the General Tax Lien, 51 MIcH. L. REV.
183 (1952).
9 Formerly INT. REv. CODE §3670. The Committee on Ways and Means of
the House of Representatives in revising this section had added, "(including the
interest of such person as tenant by the entirety)." H.R. REP. No. 8300, 83rd
Cong., 2d Sess. 686 (1954). The accompaning report stated that "This section
clarified the term 'property and rights to property' by expressly including therein
the interest of the delinquent taxpayer in an estate by the entirety." H.R. REP. No.
8300, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. A406 (1954). The Finance Committee of the Senate
reported that "This section corresponds to that of the House bill, except that the
parenthetical phrase '(including the interest of such person as tenant by the
entirety)', which phrase is not included in existing law, has been deleted. It is
not clear what change in existing law would be made by the parenthetical phrase.
The deletion of the phrase is intended to continue the existing law." SaN. REP. No.
8300, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 575 (1954). The House receded in conference. CONG.
REP. No. 8300, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1954).
10 Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265 (1945).
11 United States v. Greenville, 118 F. 2d 963, 965 (4th Cir. 1941). See also
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A reference to §6321 of the Internal Revenue Code, which in-
dicates the scope of the federal general tax lien, will show that a lien
should arise "after demand" for the tax debt. An apparent incongruity,
however, may be observed if one compares this with §6322 which states
that "Unless another date is specifically fixed by law, the lien imposed
by §6321 shall arise at the time the assessment is made ... ." The former
provision (§3671) had stated, "Unless another date is specifically fixed
by law, the lien shall arise at the time the assessment list was received by
the collector. . . ." The molding of these provisions into workable pro-
cedure was accomplished by the doctrine of relation-back,12 that is, if
the tax was not paid on demand,13 it was regarded as having been a
lien since ". .. the time the assessment list was received by the collec-
tor. . . ."" It is probable that the present provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code will receive like interpretation and that the relationship
of the tax-debtor and the tax-creditor will remain fairly clear-cut. A
difficulty presents itself, however, with the appearance of an intervening
third party where the federal government's general tax lien has arisen
without notice to such third party. The Supreme Court, faced with this
problem in United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210 (1893), recognized
the rather perilous position of an intervening third party, but held that
the federal government's general lien for taxes was valid without
recording, even against a bona fide purchaser. The Supreme Court indi-
cated that it felt compelled to arrive at this decision in the absence of
countervailing legislation and at p. 214 said, "A government that cannot,
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. United States, 107 F. 2d 311 (6th Cir. 1939),
cert. denied, 310 U.S. 630 (1940), and Clark, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 17.
12 United States v. Pacific Railroad, 1 Fed. 97 (Circuit Court, E.D. Missouri,
1880). The approach of the court in this case should be compared with that of
the later case of United States v. Snyder, '149 U.S. 210 (1893). The pertinent
part of the syllabus of United States v. Pacific Railroad, supra, reads, "The lien
of the income tax (Act July 13, 1866, 14 St. at Large, 107; Rev. St. §3186) relates
back, upon demand, to the time when the tax was due but only attaches to the
property belonging to the person from whom the tax was due at the time when the
demand for the payment of the tax was made." The result of this case as to the
protection of third parties is certainly of greater comfort than is the Snyder case,
supra, which will be discussed in more detail later. The syllabus of the Pacific
Railroad case, supra, was cited and approved in Metropolitan Savings and Loan
Co. v. Parrock, 6 Ohio Op. 518, 47 N.E. 2d 638 (1935).
13 Although the meaning of "demand" is indefinite, it would seem that an
informal demand would be sufficient. United States v. Ettelson, 159 F. 2d 193 (7th
Cir. 1947) held that the filing of a claim in a probate court against the estate of
a deceased tax-debtor was a sufficient demand to create a lien in favor of the
United States. See also Clark, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 11.
14The Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives and
the Finance Committee of the Senate reported in identical language that "This
section, which provides that the lien arises at the time the assessment is made,
conforms existing law to the change made in section 6203." H.R. REP. No. 8300,
83rd Cong., 2d Sess. A406 (1954). SEN. REP. No. 8300, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 575
(1954). Section 6203 relates to the method of assessment.
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by self-administered methods, collect from its subjects the means neces-
sary to support and maintain itself in the execution of its functions is a
government merely in name."
A lien with the tremendous scope and far reaching effects of tht
federal government's general tax lien, coupled with the interpretation of
the Snyder case, supra, which extended unrecorded liens even as against
bona fide purchasers, made property transactions a somewhat hazardous
gamble. The decision brought forth a storm of protest and legislation
was sought to quell it." This storm, however, was rot soon quieted, and
similar results were reached in other cases1" in the interim between the
Snyder case, supra, and protective legislation. Piecemeal legislation to
ameliorate this situation was only slowly passed by Congress. In 191317
protection from unrecorded general tax liens was given to purchasers, 8
mortgagees, and judgment creditors," whereas protection to pledgees20
15 An illustration of this feeling can be found in the address of the president
of the American Bar Association, William Wirt Howe, "And it may here be
remarked, that there are other elements of danger in land titles which might be
guarded against by proper legislation in Congress, or by the several states. Such
a latent defect, for example, as the Federal lien for internal revenue taxes ought
not to exist. Witness the injustice which was done, though not by any fault of the
court, in the case of the United States vs. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210, where an ancient
lien for internal revenue taxes on property which had been used as a tobacco
factory, was enforced against a subs.quent purchaser and possessor of the land,
although that purchaser never knew, or had reason to know, that the land had
ever been used for such a factory, or that any taxes were unpaid. We ought to
have an act of Congress for the recording in the mortgage office of county or
parish where the land is situate of some notice at least of the license and establish-
ment of a factory which may become indebted for internal revenue taxes, and that
such taxes will remain a lien if unpaid. It would probably be well also to provide
for the recording of notice of lis pendens in cases in the Federal Courts, in which
the judgment or decree may affect the title to property." XXI REPORTS OF THE
AMERICAu BAR AssoCIATION 235, 261 (1898). For a more recent consideration on
this matter see Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Govuernment: The
Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General Lien. 63 YALE L. J. 905, 920 (1954).
16Blacklock v. United States, 20S U.S. 75 (1908), held that a lien for unpaid
internal revenue taxes was valid against one who had taken a mortgage without
notice of such lien. United States v. Curry, 201 Fed. 371, 374 (D. Md. 1912), held
that, "The government's lien is unaffected by the fact that a subsequent in-
cumbrancer or purchaser became such without knowledge that the government had
any interest in the property or claim upon it."
17 37 STAT. 1016 (1913).
1S In interpreting "purchasers" under §3672(a) former INT. RaV. CODE, it
was stated ". . that one who, for a valuable present consideration, acquires
property or an interest in property is a 'purchaser' within the meaning of U.S.C.A.
Int. Rev. Code, §3672." National Refining Co. v. United States, 160 F. 2d 951, 955
(Sth Cir. 1947).
19 Miller v. Bank of Ameica, 166 F. 2d 415, 417 (9th Cir. 1948) held that
"In all these cases it is certain that it is the lien created by the claim of a creditor
within the meaning of recording acts which is contemplated, and not just the claim
itself . . . . A judgment in and of itself does not necessarily constitute a lien
upon any property unless made so by statute."
20 53 STAT. 882 (1939).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
and to those dealing in securities was not enacted until 1939.22 The
embodiment of this legislative protection is to be found in INT. REV.
CODE §6323(a), which, in part, reads, "Except as otherwise provided
in subsection (c), the lien imposed by §6321 shall not be valid as
against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until
notice thereof has been filed by the Secretary or his delegate-." It is
assumed that those not listed under the protective legislative provisions,
such as unsecured creditors, are to be treated like the tax-debtor in relation
to the recording requirements of the general federal tax lien as affects
its validity to them.2 3
The next problem, practically speaking, is that of the way in which
one is put on notice of a federal general tax lien. Filing of notice is
provided for in INT. REv. CODE §6323,24 which sets forth the ways in
which the collector may file.
(1) Under state or territorial laws.-n the office designated
by the law of the State or Territory in which the property
subject to the lien is situated, whenever the State or Territory
has by law designated an office within the State or Territory
for the filing of such notice; or
(2) With clerk of district court.-In the office of the derk
of the United States district court for the judicial district in
which the property subject to the lien is situated, whenever the
State or Territory has not by law designated an office-within
the State or Territory for the filing of such notice: ... 25
Since all states have enacted legislation designating a place for the
recordation of federal general tax liens, only the first provision is com-
monly used.26 In essence, all of the state statutes have for their central
purpose the provision of notice to third persons, although a variation in the
wording of the statutes exists."7 The relevant part of Ohio's statute for
recordation of general federal tax liens provides that:
Notices of liens for internal revenue taxes and of any other
lien in favor of the United States, as provided in the statutes of
the United States or any revision thereof, and certificates dis-
2153 STAT. 883 (1939).
22 Under the former INT. REV. CODE this protection for pledgees was pro-
vided for by §3672(a) and for those dealing in securities by §3672(b).
23 United States v. Sampsell, 153 F. 2d 731 (9th Cir. 1946). See also Clark,
op. cit. supra, note 2, at 17.
24Essentially this was part of former INT. REv. CODE §3672(a).
25 This section also provides a method for the collector to give notice of liens
on land in the District of Columbia. "(3) With clerk of district court for District
of Columbia.-In the office of the clerk of the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, if the property subject to'the lien is situated in the District
of Columbia."
26 New Hampshire was the last state to provide for recording in this manner.
(REv. LAws, c. 264, secs. 44-48, 1951 laws, c. 107).
27 For a breakdown of the various state statutes into groupings, see Wright,
op. cit. supra, note 8, at 184.
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charging such liens may be filed in the office of the county
recorder of the county wherein the property subject to such
lien is situated. When such notice is filed with him, the recorder
shall enter it in a book known as the "federal tax lien index,"
in alphabetical order, showing on one line the name and resi-
dence of the taxpayer named in such notice, the collector's
serial number of such notice, the date and the hour of the
filing, and the amount of tax and penalty assessed. The
recorder shall file and keep all original notices in numerical
order. When a certificate of discharge of any tax lien issued by
the collector of the internal revenue, or other proper officer,
is filed in the office of the recorder where the original notice of
lien is filed, such recorder shall enter the certificate, with the
date of filing, in the federal tax lien index, on the line where
the notice of the lien so discharged is entered, and permanently
attach the original certificate of discharge to the original notice
of the lien .... 28
In addition to the mechanical features set forth by the statute, it
should be observed that the statute provides for little more than a blanket
notice of possible federal general tax liens. Until 1942 the applicable
provision for filing of notice had been "In accordance with the law of the
State or Territory . . .," but at that time the language was revised to
read, "In the office in which the filing of such notice is authorized by the
law of the State or Territory. . . ," The Internal Revenue Code of
1954 now reads, "In the office designated by the law of the State or
Territory. . . ." The net result of these statutory changes of wording
thus indicates a Congressional intent to make the state statutes applicable
only in so far as to provide a place for notice to be filed. The type of
notice, that is, a blanket notice, however, is to be controlled by federal
law. "For example, the omission from the notice of lien of a description
of the property subject to the lien would not affect the validity thereof,
even though the law of the State or Territory requires that the notice of
28 OHIo REv. CoDn §317.09 (2757-1).
29 Blanket liens were held ineffective to give notice under applicable state
law providing for specific description in a Michigan case under the pre-1942
language. United States v. Maniaci, 36 F. Supp. 293 (W.D. Mich. 1939), aff'd per
curiam, 116 F. 2d 935 (6th Cir. 1940). A later case from the same district inter-
preting the 1942 statutory language also arrived at a similar result. Youngblood v.
United States, 141 F. 2d 912 (6th Cir. 1944). See Clark, op. cit, supra, note 2, at 15.
An account of this phase of the Michigan situation is given in Wright, op. cit.
supra, note 8, at 190, where the author states that . . . the future may hold in
store a decision to the effect that the collector in Michigan has been entitled since
1942 to validate liens against third parties by filing blanket notices with the clerk
of the appropriate federal district court in Michigan." The author had previously
assumed that the change in the federal statutory language was not an attempt, to
coerce the state officials of Michigan to record blanket notices in violation of their
state duty to take only those liens providing specific descriptions of the property
involved.
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lien contain a description of the property subject to the lien." 30 Ohio's
requirement that only a blanket notice need be filed is adequate. If Ohio
should require more than blanket notice, that is, specific description of the
property involved, the federal government still would have recourse to
filing a blanket notice with the clerk of the district court in accordance
with INT. REv. CODE §6323(a) (2), since §6323(b) provides that
If the notice filed pursuant to subsection (a) (1) is in such
form as would be valid if filed with the clerk of the United
States district court pursuant to subsection (a) (2), such notice
shall be valid notwithstanding any law of the State or Territory
regarding the form or content of a notice of lien.3 '
Because the Ohio statute 2 provides only for blanket notice, which is all
that would be effective, one examining title in Ohio must be wary of
such blanket notices and not rest merely with the examination of title to
specifically described property.8 3
As noted earlier in connection with the creation of the federal
general tax lien, the Internal Revenue Code in §6322 provides that
"Unless another date is specifically fixed by law, the lien imposed by
§6321 shall arise at the time the assessment is made and shall continue
unt the liability for the amount so assessed is satisfied or becomes un-
enforceable by reason of lapse of time." Thus the obvious method of
extinguishing the lien is by satisfaction of the underlying tax debt. An-
other method by which the lien can 'be terminated is by permitting the
statute of limitations, which is controlled by federal law,8 4 to run."
80H.R. REP. No. 8300, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. A407 (1954). SEN. RaP. No.
8300, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 576 (1954). The same sections further stated that
"Subsection (b) of this section is declaratory of the existing procedure and in
accordance with the long-continued practice of the Treasury Department."
s1Possibly the same assumption can be, made now as was made by Wright,
supra, that the change in statutory language is not an attempt to coerce state officials
to 'iolate their state duty.
82 OHIo REV. CODE §317.09 (2757-1).
83 It is of merit to note that INT. REv. CODE §6323 (d) provides, "If a notice
of lien has been filed under subsection (a), the Secretary or his delegate is
authorized to provide by rules o" regulations the extent to which, and the con-
ditions under which, information as to the amount of the outstanding obligation
secured by the lien may be disclosed." "This is necessary for the protection of
persons dealing with property subject to the lien who have a legitimate interest
in determining the amount of the outstanding obligation, as well as to aid re-
establishment of the taxpayer's credit." SEN. REP. No. 8300, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess.
576 (1954). H.R. REP. No. 8300, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. A407 (1954).
34Taylor v. United States, 342 Mass. 639, 642, 88 N.E. 2d 121, 123 (1949)
states, "We consider it settled that a claim of the United States is not barred,
,even in a State Court, by a State statute of limitations or by the laches of officers
or agents of the United States."
85 Although the date of assessment is of particular importance, one should
note that United States v. Ettelson, 159 F. 2d 193, 196 (7th Cir. 1947) held that
"The District Court erred in holding that the precise date that the lien arose had
to be proved and that the Government had no lien because of failure to make
such proof."
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According to INT. REV. CODE §6502,3" an assessed tax may not be
collected after six years from the assessment date37 unless there has been
an agreement or waiver38 to extend the statutory period.39 Logically,
then, when the tax debt can no longer be collected, it would seem that
the federal general tax lien could no longer be enforced.40 Such is not
always the case, however, for the situation may arise in which the under-
lying tax debt has been reduced to a federal judgment with the result
that execution apparently can be had indefinitely.4
THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX LIEN
It will be recalled that the tax-debtor's neglect to pay "any tax"
can result in the creation of a lien upon all the tax-debtor's "... . property
and rights to property, whether real or personal. .. ." The language of
this general provision appears broad enough to cover the federal estate
tax lien, but a specific statutory provision has been made for it.' Section
36 Section 6502(a) states that "Where the assessment of any tax imposed by
this title has been made within the period of limitation properly applicable thereto,
such tax may be collected by levy or by a proceeding in court, but only if the levy
is made or the proceeding begun-(1) within 6 years after the assessment of the
tax, or (2) prior to the expiration of any period for collection agreed upon in
writing by the Secretary or his delegate and the taxpayer before expiration of such
6-year period (or, if there is a release of levy under section 6343 after such
6-year period, then before such release). The period so agreed upon may be
extended by subsequent agreements in writing made before the expiration of the
period previously agreed upon."
37 See §6322, supra.
38 Cases prior to the 1954- INT. REV. CoDE have held in effect that a waiver
may be good as against third parties. United States v. Spreckels, 50 F. Supp. 789
(N.D. Cal. 1943), Bank of Commerce and Trust Co. v. United States, 32 F. Supp.
942, aff'd, 124 F. 2d 187 (6th Cir. 1941). Also see 174 A.L.R. 1378 (1948).
39 The mechanics of recording the discharge-of a lien are set out in OHIO Rv.
CoDe §317.09 (2757-1), supra, note 28.
40 United States v. Spreckels, 50 F. Supp. 789, 791 (N.D. Cal. 1943) states
that "Section 3671 provides that 'unless another date is specifically fixed by law, the
lien shall arise at the time the assessment list was received by the collector and
shall continue until the liability for such amount is satisfied or becomes unenforce-
able by reason of lapse of time.' To determine when the lien becomes 'unenforce-
able by reason of lapse of time' these two sections should be read together, for
if the statute ran on the tax itself the lien, which is only security therefor, should
simultaneously expire." Former §3671 has now been changed to read, in §6322,
"... the lien ... shall arise at the time the assessment is made . .. ."
41 Investment and Securities Co. v. United States, 140 F. 2d 894, 896 (9th Cir.
1944), states that "There is no federal statutory provision as to a period of
limitations on this judgment; it follows that in the absence of such a limitation
a tax can be collected at any time; therefore, the liability of the tax now merged
in the judgment has not become unenforcible by reason of lapse of time." See
also Clark, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 12.
42 The estate tax lien and the gift tax lien are often considered together in
both practice and discussion. Sanford v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 308
U.S. 39, 44 (1939) reads that "the gift tax was supplementary to the estate tax.
The two are in pari materia and must be construed together . . -. . An important,
;f not the main, purpose of the gift tax was to prevent or compensate for avoidance
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6324(a) (1) provides that "Unless the estate tax imposed by chapter 11
is sooner paid in full, it shall be a lien for 10 years upon the gross estate
of the decedent. .. .
The general definition of gross estate is given in §2031(a):
The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be deter-
mined by including to the extent provided for in this part, the
value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal,
tangible or intangible, wherever situated, except real property
situated outside of the United States.
The property is described in the INT. REv. CODE §§2033 to 2044 as
follows: Property in Which the Decedent Had an Interest; Dower or
Courtesy Interests; Transactions in Contemplation of Death;" Transfers
With Retained Life Estate; Transfers Taking Effect at Death; Re-
vocable Transfers; Annuities; Joint Interests; Powers of Appointment;
Proceeds of Life Insurance; Transfers for Insufficient Consideration;
Prior Interests. It should be emphasized that these federal provisions4"
rather than state law,46 are controlling as to what constitutes the "gross
estate."
Although §6324(a) (1) clearly provides for a federal estate tax
lien, the language does not specify when such lien comes into existence.
It was noted that the federal general tax lien comes into being when the
assessment is made and is held to exist from that time by the doctrine of
relation-back from the time of demand.47 The separate statutory pro-
vision for the federal estate tax lien raises the question of whether or
not it is also given separate judicial construction as to the time it arises.4"
An affirmative answer was given to this question in the leading case of
of death taxes by taxing the gifts of property inter ,ivos which, but for the gift!,
would be subject in its original or converted form to the tax laid upon transfers
at death." A comparison of the estate tax lien and the gift tax lien is of value and
should be noted by the reader. To a large extent, such a comparison has been
made in Peters and Maxey, The Gift Tax Lien and the Examination of Abstracts,
5 MIAMI L.Q. 64 (1950). The separate consideration of these two liens was used
in this article as a matter of mechanics to emphasize the particular lien involved,
as was also done with the federal general tax lien.
43 Formerly INT. Rav. CODE, §827(a).
44 "A finding by Internal Revenue Commissioner.that motives connected with
anticipation of death were impelling or dominant in making a gift, so that transfer
was in contemplation of donor's death within statute requiring inclusion of
property so transferred in deceased transferor's taxable estate, must stand, unless
its factual conclusion as to motive is clearly erroneous." In re Belyea's Estate v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 206 F. 2d 262 (3rd Cir. 1953). This particular
case, however, did reverse the finding of the Internal Revenue Commissioner.
45 These provisions were formerly in INT. REV. CODE §811.
46 See Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329 (1943); see also Clark,
op. cit. supra, note 2, at 20.
47' See discussion relating to note 12, supra.
48 The question of separate judicial construction of the federal estate tax
lien from the federal general tax lien should also be used in distinguishing the
latter from the federal gift tax lien.
[Vol. 16
COMMENTS
Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 332 (1943), which states
that "The lien attaches at the date of the decedent's death ...and the
estate tax itself becomes an obligation of the estate at that time without
assessment." In this case the United States Supreme Court stated at p. 334
that "The differences between R.S. §3186 [now §6321] and §315(a),
[now §6324(a) (1)] and their legislative history as separate enact-
ments, indicate that each was intended to operate independently of the
other." Within this discussion, of course, it is implicit that "The federal
'estate tax' is not a debt of the deceased, but is an excise levy upon trans-
fer or transmission or deceased's estate, the liability for payment of which
arises at [the] moment of [the] deceased's death." 49
Although the federal estate tax lien attaches to all of the gross
estate,50 protection has been afforded to certain third parties in limited
situations. Former INT. REv. CODE §827(b) provided that "Any part
of such property sold by such spouse, transferee, trustee, . . . or bene-
ficiary, to a bona fide purchaser for an adequate and full consideration
in money or money's worth shall be divested of the lien." 51 Since only
bona fide purchasers were given protection by the above statute, there was
no protection extended to others of a bona fide status dealing with the
"... spouse, transferee, trustee.., or beneficiary .... , 5 2 This lack was
recognized, and additional protection was given in the 1954 INT. REv.
49 Bigoness v. Anderson, 106 F. Supp. 986 (D. D.C. 1952).
50 One should distinguish the lien itself from the recipient's personal liability,
which is provided for in INT. REv. CODE §6324(a) (2) which reads, "If the estate
tax imposed by chapter 11 is not paid when due, then the spouse, transferee ...
or beneficiary, who receives, or has on the date of the decedent's death, property
included in the gross estate under sections 2034- to 2042, inclusive, to the extent
of the value, at the time of the decedent's death, of such property, shall be person-
ally liable for such tax." Peters and Maxey, op. cit. supra, note 42 at 65, in
interpreting similar statutory language under the former INT. REV. CoDE §827(b),
commented on this point as follows, "... the property required to be included in
the gross estate of the decedent is regarded as being of two kinds; type 1, the
interest of the decedent in the property at the time of his death; and type 2,
the interests of others, in property which must be included in his gross estate,
which mature by reason of the death of the decedent. It is only in connection
with type two that the personal liability of the recipient for any of the estate
tax arises, although the estate tax lien itself attaches to all the property of the
estate."
51 Peters and Maxey, op. cit. sutra, note 42, at 68, in completing their
analysis, comment that, "As to the estate tax lien, only those specified property
interests received by the beneficiaries which made them personally liable for the
tax (type two above) are divested of the lien when sold to a bona fide purchaser
for an adequate consideration."
52 In commenting upon former INT. REv. CoDE §827(b), Wright, Title Exami-
nations as Affected by the Federal Gift and Estate Tax Liens, 51 MIcH. L. Rev.,
325, 326 (1953), had suggested that perhaps "purchaser" could be so interpreted
to include a "mortgagee" and stated that ". . . the scales before a federal court
might well be tipped by a policy argument, namely, that the merits of a mortgagee's
case are the same as are those of the purchaser-a matter which has led state
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CODE §6324(a) (2), which reads, "Any part of such property trans-
ferred by (or transferred by a transferee of) such spouse, transferee,
trustee . . . or beneficiary, to a bona fide purchaser, mortgagee, or
pledgee, for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth shall be divested of the lien provided in paragraph (1)....
The statutory limitation of the divestment of the lien to a "bona
fide purchaser, mortgagee, [or] pledgee" raises the question of just who
comes within these classifications. "It is a general rule that a purchaser,
who in good faith acquires the legal title to lands for a valuable con-
sideration without notice of an existing equity, takes title free from such
equity.""ss It will be noted that there are three general prerequisites for
becoming a bona fide purchaser: (1) a general presence of good faith,
(2) a valuable consideration, (3) a purchaser without notice. In each
of these three elements we are confronted with the problem of making
distinctions which, of-course, cannot be abstractly generalized upon in
the scope of this discussion and which are dependent upon the particular
facts in the individual cases. Probably an adequate definition of a
person acting in good faith is "One who acts without covin, fraud, or
collusion; one who ... [is] in the commission of or connivance at no
fraud. . . ?"' The older notion of a merely adequate consideration
seemingly has 'been extended to something more, since Section 6324(a)
(2) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that "... an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth . . ." must be given to
divest the lien. (Italics added.)
Essentially the requisites for becoming a bona fide mortgagee are the
same as those for becoming a bona fide purchaser, namely, (1) a general
presence of good faith, (2) a valuable consideration, (3) absence of
notice. 6 Thus the previous discussion of the first two of these elements
in connection with becoming a bona fide purchaser is applicable here.
The elements necessary for becoming a bona fide pledgee are similar
to those needed for the other two classifications. The second element of
courts in some cases arising in the context of property law to treat mortgagees as
'purchasers pro tanto. " To support this suggestion he cited Bacon v. Van Schoon-
hoven, 87 N.Y. 446 (1882).
53 The complete list of those enumerated in INT. Ray. CODE §6324(a) (2) is
"... spouse, transferee, trustee, surviving tenant, person in possession of property
by reason of the exercise, nonexercise, or release of a power of appointment, or
beneficiary. .. ."
54 Shaker Corlett Land Co., v. City of Cleveland, 139 Ohio St. 536, 541,
41 N.E. 2d 243, 246 (1942). Here it was decided that absence of notice is not an
essential element in being a bona fide purchaser of registered lands, and, although
this is not a federal lien case, it would still be applicable in this discussion since
the case points out that "(i)t is a general rule. . . " See also, 3 POMEROY, EQurrr
JURISPRUDENCE 3 (5 Ed. 1941); 5 WoRDs AND PHRASES 623 et seq. (1940).
55 Sanders v. McAffee, 42 Ga. 250 (1870). See generally BLACr'S LAw
DMToNxARY 224 (4th Ed. 1951).
56 Companaro v. Gondolfo, 60 F. 2d 451, 452 (3rd Cir. 1932).
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consideration requires that ". . . the pledgee must have a lien on the
property for the payment of a debt or the performance of an obligation
due him by the pledgor. . .";"¢ this would seem to exist in the property
involved only to the amount of being "... adequate and ful consideration
in money or money's worth.... ." (Italics added.)
The third essential element in attaining a bona fide status has not
as yet been considered in any of the three classifications. As a practical
matter, the problem of ascertaining what constitutes notice is perhaps the
most difficult of the three. It is possible that the issue of notice might,
for various reasons, receive similar treatment in the cases of bona fide
purchaser, mortgagee,5 8 and pledgee."' The possibility of similar inter-
pretation is suggested by the fact that the presence of absolute knowledge
of an existing federal estate tax lien would appear to prevent one from
attaining a bona fide status in any of the three classifications. Another
reason for suggesting that these three classifications might be given
corresponding judicial interpretation is that the prior treatment of bona
fide purchaser (the only exception made for one with a bona fide status
under former INT. REV. CODE §827 (b) ) would probably be the same
under the present Internal Revenue Code. Thus, to achieve uniformity
of treatment in considering these three 'bona fide classes, it would be
necessary to extend the same judicial interpretation to the two new classes.
It has already been noted that a generalization of who may become
a bona fide purchaser, mortgagee, or pledgee is at best inadequate because
the number of fact situations that may arise in making such a determi-
nation are legion; but it is possible that the nature of the most pressing of
the three elements, notice, can best be explained by generalization. If one
were in a position in which he could reasonably be put on notice of a
federal estate tax lien, it seems that he would be denied a bona fide
status; and, since the passing of property by death is normally by a pro-
ceeding of public notoriety, such proceeding also would probably operate
to deny bona fide status60 If one were not apprised, however, of any
circumstances which would lead him to believe that an estate tax lien
exists, then either (1) no estate tax lien does in fact exist, or (2) the un-
recorded estate tax lien does exist, but it is not valid against a bona fide
purchaser, mortgagee, or pledgee. It will thus be seen in the second
57 BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNAY 1312 (4th Ed. 1951).
58Although a mortgagee does not have the first lien, he still may attain
bona fide status if there is enough property left to cover his own interest. See 3
GLENN, MoRTGAGEs §378 et seq. (1943).
59 This would seem to be applicable also in the case of the federel gift tax
lien..
6 0 Peters and Maxey, op. cit. supra, note 42, at 67, comment that "Property
passing at death is normally dealt with by probate proceedings of public notoriety
and there is less need to protect third parties by requiring notice of a lien." The
two authors then surmise, in commenting upon the case of Detroit Bank v. United
States, 317 U.S. 328 (1943), that "In any event the mortgagee could have protected
himself by securing a certificate of release from the commissioner."
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alternative that if the lien does not exist as to the bona fide purchaser,
mortgagee, or pledgee, it is in effect the same as saying that it no longer
attaches to the property transferred to these persons. This does not mean
that the lien no longer exists, but that it no longer attaches to the property
transferred to the bona fide purchaser, mortgagee, or pledgee; that is,
the lien now attaches to other property of the transferor.0 ' The lien
now existing on such other property should be considered as an in-
dependent lien and treated as such.
The last thing to be mentioned in connection with the federal estate
tax lien isits possible duration. Section 6324(a) (1) of the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code provides that "Unless the estate tax imposed by chapter 11
is sooner paid in full, it shall be a lien for 10 years upon the gross estate
of the decedent . .,,6" Again, the obvious method of eliminating the
estate tax lien is by payment of the underlying tax debt; if payment is
not made, the statute clearly provides a ten year duration for the federal
estate tax lien. 3
THE FEDERAL GIFr TAx LmN
The statutory provision for the federal gift tax lien is found in
the INT. REv, CODE §6324(b), the pertinent part of which states that
... the gift tax imposed by chapter 12 shall be a lien upon all
gifts made during the calendar year, for 10 years from -the
time the gifts are made. If the tax is not paid when due, the
donee of any gift shall be personally liable for such tax to the
extent of the value of such gift.
It is often difficult to determine whether a federal gift tax lien exists,
since the question of the existence of a gift must sometimes be decided
by judicial determination. In the absence of such judicial action, there
still are various factors that might suggest a gift. Where it is not apparent
that a gift 'has been made, one examining title to property could well be
justified in being suspicious of such factors as merely nominal consider-
ation which, if correctly indicating a gift, might mean an unpaid federal
61 INT. REv. CODE §6324(a) (2) provides in part that ". . . a like lien shall
then attach to all the property of such spouse, transferee, trustee, surviving tenant,
person in possession, beneficiary, or transferee of any such person, except any part
transferred to a bona fide purchaser, mortgagee, or pledgee for an adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth." See Smythe v. United States,
169 F. 2d 49 (1st Cir. 1948), a case involving eminent domain in which it was held
that an estate tax lien attaches to the money substituted in place of the land. A
provision similar to the one quoted above covering the case in which the executor
has been discharged is provided for in INT. Rv. CODE §6324(a) (3) which states,
. . the lien shall attach to the consideration received from such purchaser,
mortgagee, or'pledgee by the heirs, legatees, devisees, or distributees."
62 The remainder of INT. REv. CODE §6324(a) (1) provides that "... except
that such part of the gross estate as is used for the payment of charges against the
estate and expenses of its administration, allowed by any court having jurisdiction
thereof, shall be divested of such lien."
63 See also possibility raised by note 41, supra.
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gift tax resulting in a federal gift tax lien; or recorded nominal con-
sideration with parties not dealing at arms' length where the last names
of the transferor and the transferee are the same. One might also be wary
of a transfer of property in which an entry for revenue stamps is absent.
The situations that could arise from such facts cannot, of course, be
easily narrowed down within the limitations of this paper but must again
rest upon the particular fact pattern involved in the individual case.
It seems readily apparent that the determination of whether or not a
gift exists is no easy matter but requires the consideration of numerous
factors.
The time at which the lien arises is dearly stated in the statute, that
is, immediately upon the making of the gift. This lien is, in its relation-
ship to third parties, much like that of the federal estate tax lien as is
apparent from the relevant portion of the statute regulating the federal
gift tax lien in relation to third parties:
Any part of the property comprised in the gift transferred by
the donee (or by a transferee of the donee) to a bona fide
purchaser, mortgagee, or pledgee for an adequate and full con-
sideration in money or money's worth shall be divested of the
lien herein imposed and the lien, to the extent of the value of
such gift, shall attach to all the property (including after-
acquired property) of the donee (or the transferee) except any
part transferred to a ,bona fide purchaser, mortgagee, or pledgee
for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth.
64
The question has been asked, "Should an attorney unconditionally pass
upon the title to real property without first determining whether any
owner, including any co-tenant, had acquired or transferred the property
within the past ten years for less than an adequate and full consideration
in money or money's worth?"6 5
Here, as with the federal estate tax lien, there is the problem of who
may attain the status of bona fide purchaser, mortgagee, or pledgee.
Although the material concerning the estate tax lien as to attaining a
bona fide status will, for the most part, suffice in the present discussion,
there are significant points of difference which call for further elaboration.
The first requisite of general good faith is essentially the same. As to the
second element of consideration the statute demands that there be "...
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth." '6 (Italics
added). The problem of notice becomes more burdensome in this dis-
cussion of the federal gift tax lien than it was with the federal estate
tax lien, because of the additional issues brought about by having to
determine in the first instance whether or not a gift exists between the
6 4 INT. REv. CODE §6324(b).65 Peters and Maxey, op. cit. supra, note 42, at 64.
6 6
INT. REv. CODE §6324(b).
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original donor and donee. But if the three essential elements have been
met, then, of course, a 'bona fide status has been attained.
The two logical alternatives, then, are (I) that there is presently
no federal gift tax lien existing on the involved property, or (2) that
there is an unrecorded gift tax lien existing on the involved property
which is not valid as against a bona fide purchaser, mortgagee, or pledgee.
The situation resulting from either of the above alternatives as to the bona
fide purchaser, mortgagee, or pledgee would apparently be the same.
If (2) were the case, however, one would be confronted with the trans-
fer of the lien -to the property "... of the donee (or the transferee)
. . .,6 as under similar circumstances with the federal estate tax lien.
The lien provided by the transfer to the property of the donee, of course,
now must be considered as a separate problem in itself, "And, so, the
circle starts again; and years later perhaps in some obscure and unrelated
transaction, some piece of property may be found subject to lien for
unpaid, long forgotten, gift taxes.""8
The final point to be cosidered in connection with the federal gift
tax lien is its possible duration. Section 6324(b) of the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code provides that ". . the gift tax imposed by chapter 12
shall be a lien upon all gifts made during the calendar year for 10 years
from the time the gifts are made."0 " It is obvious that paying the under-
lying liability will free the property from the lien, and a release may be
provided by ".. . the Secretary or his delegate.... ." Perhaps this gives
as good as answer as any to the problem of finding out whether or not a
federal gift tax lien presently exists on the involved property. Of course,
"The very method by whicli the property is to *be certified as free of the
lien may well have been provided by Congress as one of the more effective
means by which the gift tax was to be enforced." '71
RELEASE OF LIEN OR PARTIAL DISCHARGE OF PROPERTY
The previous discussion of the federal tax liens has made some
mention of the subject of this section of the article, which may be found
in §6325 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.72
A release of a federal tax lien may be made, "Subject to such rules
or regulations as the Secretary or his delegate may prescribe, the Secretary
or his delegate may issue a certificate of release of any lien imposed with
respect to any internal revenue tax if-(1) Liability satisfied or un-
enforceable . . . or (2) Bond accepted ... " In subsection (1) the
67 Ibid.
68 Peters and Maxey, op. cit. supra, note 42, at 71.
69 See also the possibility raised by note 41, supra.
70 INT. Rzv. CODE §6325 (a). This will be dealt with in greater detail later.
71 Peters and Maxey, op. cit. supra, note 42, at 72.
72 Formerly this subject was covered by INT. Rav. CODE §§827(a), 1009,
3673(a), 3673(b), 3674(a), 3674(b), 3675. For a discussion of these sections see
Clark, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 27.
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statute distinguishes the general tax from the estate and gift taxes and
provides that:
The Secretary or his delegate finds that the liability for the
amount assessed, together with all interest in respect thereof,
has been fully satisfied, has become legally unenforceable, or,
in the case of the estate tax imposed by chapter 11 or the gift
tax imposed by chapter 12, has been fully satisfied or provided
for....
The second method provided for the release of a federal tax lien is
by the furnishing of ".... a bond that is conditioned upon the payment
of the amount assessed, together with all interest in respect thereof. .. ."
Section 6325 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that there
also may be a partial discharge of the involved property through either
of two methods: "(1) Property double the amount of the liability" and
"(2) Part payment or interest of United States valueless." Under the
first method of partial release the standards of fair evaluation would be
used in arriving at a conclusion that the property is double the amount
of the lien, although a natural reluctance on the part of the revenue
officers to release the property in the close cases should probably be ex-
pected. The second provides two methods of receiving a partial discharge
of the involved property. The first method of part payment seems clear
enough to pass without further comment. The second method of receiving
a partial discharge under this section is if ". . . the Secretary or his
delegate determines at any time that the interest of the United States in
the part to be so discharged has no value.!" 3 Again it is to be expected
that revenue officers would be hesitant to declare property as valueless to
the United States.
Section 6325 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code relates to the matter
of the effect of a certificate of release or partial discharge, and provides
that, "A certificate of release or of partial discharge issued under this
section shall be held conclusive that the lien upon the property covered
by the certificate is extinguished." In an earlier case interpreting a
provision similar to the one under discussion it was held that if one pro-
cured a certificate by fraud, such certificate could later be set aside.
74
Thus the certificate itself is not always a guarantee that the underlying
tax debt has been paid. 5
CONCLUSION
For a government to exist it clearly must have the ability to lay
and to collect taxes. One of the more effective methods by which a
73 INT. RE . CoDE §6325(b) (2) (b).
74 In re Bowen, 151 F. 2d 690 (3rd Cir. 1945).
75 Related topics that were not included in this article are found in INT.
REv. CODE §7424, a provision for suits to clear title to realty which is dealt with
in Clark, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 22; and in IxT. REv. CODE §7403, a provision
relating to suits to enforce liens which is dealt with in Clark, op. cit. supra,
note 2, at 21.
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government can do this is the use of tax liens on property, three types of
which have been discussed. The nature of these liens is such that it is
not always easy to determine when they exist. The question of whether
or not the government holds a lien is one with many ramifications, and
those concerned with examining title to property must -be wary lest they
find themselves entangled in one of them. The various matters which
must be considered in determining whether or not a lien exists require a
thorough understanding of the manner in which they arise and are
extinguished as well as their duration. These factors cannot be summarily
dismissed, and to lay some of the stepping stones to arrive at a satisfactory
conclusion has been the purpose of this article.
Charles R. Leech, Jr.
COMMON CARRERs-DuTY TO SERvE
STRIKEBOUND SHIPPER
The plaintiff, a shipper sought damages from railroad for failing
to switch in cars to its plant, while plant was under strike and picketed
by its employees. The district court allowed plaintiff damages. On appeal
by railroad, held, affirmed on the law, but remanded for redetermination
of damages. Railroad has duty to provide service upon reasonable request.
49 U.S.C.A. §1 (4). Shipper must expressly request cars even though he
knows request may be futile where the tariff prescribes that orders must
be given for any cars desired. Damages are allowable to the shipper on
basis of actual reasonable requests with which carrier failed to comply.
Minneapolis and St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 215
F. 2d 126, (8th Cir. 1954).
The shippers suit was based on the duty to provide cars under §184
of the Interstate Commerce Act. 36 STAT. 545 (1910), as amended. 49
U.S.C. §1(4) (1946). This statute is declaratory of every carrier's
common law duty. Lucking v. Detroit & C. Navigation Co., 273 Fed.
577 (E.D. Mich. 1921); Farmer's Grain Co. v. Toledo, P. & W.R.R.,
66 F. Supp. 845 (S.D. I1. 1946); 10 CORPUS JURUs, CARIERs §66.
At common law a carrier was obligated to accept and transport all
commodities which it held itself out to transport and further to serve all
persons without unreasonable advantage to any. Jackson v. Rogers,
2 Shaw (K.B.) 327, 89 Eng. Rep. 968 (1695); Coggs v. Bernard,
2 Ld. Raymond 909, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (1703); Gibbon v. Paynton,
4 Burr. 2298, 98 Eng. Rep. 199 (1769); Niagara v. Cordes, 21
Howard 2, 62 L.Ed. 41 (1858). The essentials of the common law
duty are to receive, carry, and deliver goods. Wabash Railroad v. Pierce,
192 U.S. 179 (1904). At common law, a verbal request for service
indicated goods were to be transported and imposed a duty. Bell v.
Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 163 N.C. 180, 79 S.E. 421 (1913).
At early common law, the carrier was excused from his duty only
in the event of an act of God or interference by enemies of the king.
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